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NOTES

Beyond
Economics:
The U.S.
Recognition
of
International
Financial Reporting Standards as
an International Subdelegation of
the SEC's Rulemaking Authority
ABSTRACT

A final rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 2008 allowing foreign private securities
issuers to prepare SEC-required financial disclosures under
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) as
promulgated by the InternationalAccounting Standards Board
(LASB) is a highly significant event for U.S. and global capital
markets. However, surprisinglyfew questions have been asked
regarding the SEC's legal authority to take such an
unprecedentedstep.
This Note assesses the recent SEC action with regard to
IASB from two perspectives-traditionaladministrative law,
with particularemphasis on delegations by government entities
to private parties, and international law, with particular
emphasis on the ability of a national government to delegate
some portion of its sovereignty to international bodies. This
Note concludes that the SEC does not currently possess the
authority necessary to recognize IASB as an official accounting
standard-setter,and that Congress must take the lead on any
proposed agency action which would function as an
internationaldelegation of authority.
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In the U.S. capital markets many .. . are anxious to capitalize on the
benefits of having a widely used set of accounting standards accepted
and in place. I am excited about this opportunity, but I also want to
1
make sure we get it right.

I. INTRODUCTION

The prevailing regime of financial accounting and reporting for
publicly held companies in the U.S. is currently undergoing
significant changes. Almost since its inception, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has "outsourced" its statutory
authority to promulgate financial accounting rules 2 applicable to
companies that must make financial disclosures under the federal
securities laws. 3
The SEC currently recognizes the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the organization empowered
to promulgate such accounting rules. 4
Although several
organizations have been recognized by the SEC as officially
establishing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) since
the 1930s, 5 all of these organizations (in their role as standardsetters) have worked exclusively toward the goal of establishing rules
and practices for U.S. companies-or, at least, for those companies
6
wishing to access U.S. capital markets.

1.
Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities RegulatorLooks at Convergence, 25 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 661, 662 (2005).
2.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2008) ("[T]he
Commission shall have authority ... to prescribe ...the methods to be followed in the
preparation of accounts ....
"). This Note uses the terms "rules," "principles," and
"standards" interchangeably to refer to those substantive accounting guidelines which
are or may soon be controlling under the federal securities laws.
3.
Andrew F. Kirkendall, Comment, Filling in the GAAP: Will the SarbanesOxley Act Protect Investors from Corporate Malfeasance and Restore Confidence in the
SecuritiesMarket?, 56 SMU L. REV. 2303, 2306-07 (2003).
4.
Id. at 2307-08.
5.
See id. (providing a brief chronology of the SEC's delegation to various
accounting organizations).
6.
See Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial
Statements in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards,
Securities Act Release No. 8831, Exchange Act Release No. 56,217, Investment
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Recently, however, the SEC has considered allowing companies,
both foreign and U.S.-based, to disclose financial information in
accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) promulgated by the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB). 7 In 2006, the SEC began allowing foreign-based
securities issuers to file with the SEC financial statements prepared
in accordance with IFRS and containing a conversion or
"reconciliation" from IFRS to U.S. GAAP 8 (as opposed to financial
SEC
statements prepared entirely in accordance with GAAP).
Chairman Christopher Cox publicly stated that he wanted the SEC to
"eliminate, by 2009 at the latest, the SEC requirement for foreign
private issuers to reconcile IFRS-based financial statements to US
GAAP." 9 However, in the most recent and arguably most important
development in the U.S. shift toward the use of international
accounting standards, the SEC promulgated a final rule in January
2008 that allowed foreign private securities issuers to file IFRS-based
financial statements with the SEC without including a reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP. 10 This development comes despite the fact that many
in business and academia hold reservations against recognizing IFRS
without a corresponding IFRS-GAAP reconciliation."
A recognition of the validity of IFRS in regards to the fulfillment
of financial disclosure requirements under U.S. securities laws marks

Company Act Release No, 27,924, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600, 45,601 (Aug. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 Concept Release] ("[T]he Commission historically has looked to
private-sector bodies to provide standards for financial reporting by issuers in the U.S.
public capital market.").
See id. (soliciting public comments on the SEC's proposal to give "U.S.
7.
issuers . . . the option to file ...

financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS

as published by the IASB").
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Accounting Standards: SEC
8.
Chairman Cox and EU Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to Elimination of
the Need for Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-17.htm [hereinafter Cox-McCreevy Statement].
9.
Id.
10.
Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared
in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release
No. 57,026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008). The pertinent language provides that
"financial statements [of foreign private issuers] may be prepared according to U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or International Financial Reporting
Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board." 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.4-01(a)(2) (2008).
11.
See, e.g., International Accounting Standards: Opportunities, Challenges,
and Global Convergence Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance,
and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 110th Cong.
2 (2007) (statement of Teri Lombardi Yohn, Associate Professor, Kelley School of
Business, Indiana University), available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/yohn.pdf
[hereinafter Yohn Statement] (arguing that "the elimination of the required IFRS-U.S.
GAAP reconciliation is premature . . . and will cause U.S. investors to possess a
significantly diminished set of relevant information for investment-related decision
making").

20091

BEYOND ECONOMICS: US. RECOGNITION OF IFRS

the first occasion upon which the SEC has given such recognition to
international standards. This Note argues that the SEC's recognition
of an international accounting standard-setter essentially acts as a
further delegation, or subdelegation, of the rulemaking authority
Congress originally vested in the SEC. 12 Recently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expressed concern about
the validity of delegations of government power to foreign
organizations, 1 3 and legal scholars have noted the complex issues and
divergent interests inherent in such delegations.14
An assessment of the recognition of IFRS in the U.S. must
necessarily extend beyond a purely economic analysis 15 and must also
critically analyze the constitutional and political validity of
recognition by a federal administrative agency of international
standards in an area of law that previously had been strictly the
domain of U.S.-based organizations. 16 This assessment can be broken
down into two steps: (1) an analysis of the SEC's ability to
subdelegate its authority to create accounting principles that are
controlling under the federal securities laws; and (2) an analysis of
the legality of and the policy considerations involved in delegating
federal power to an international organization, either by one of the
three main branches of the federal government or by an
administrative agency in the form of a subdelegation. This Note
concludes that though there are no specific constitutional limitations
on the ability of the federal government to delegate authority to
international organizations, there are two reasons why the SEC does
not currently possess the authority necessary to recognize IFRS in

12.
See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 299 (2008) ("[A] permissible
delegation of legislative power sometimes may be subdelegated or redelegated."). This
proposition is discussed more thoroughly infra Part III.
13.
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("There
is significant debate over the constitutionality of assigning lawmaking functions to
international bodies.").
14.
Compare Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1501 (2004) (arguing that "delegating national
power to international institutions ... provides a bulwark against the concentration of
political power in the national government that is consistent with the ambitions of
federalism"), with Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 74 (2000)
(arguing that a stricter, more formalistic constitutional approach "is precisely what is
needed in the case of international delegations because such delegations are
meaningfully different from delegations to states and private parties"). These views are
discussed further infra Part N.A.
15.
Although this Note will address some of the economic factors which would
influence a potential SEC recognition of IFRS, it will focus primarily on the legal
implications of such recognition. A summary of many of the economic arguments in
favor of the adoption of IFRS in the U.S. can be found in Mark J. Hanson, Becoming
One: The SEC Should Join the World in Adopting the International Financial
Reporting Standards, 28 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 521, 532-42 (2006).
16.
Kirkendall, supra note 3, at 2307-08.
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the U.S.: (1) because the recognition of IASB as an authorized
accounting standard-setter constitutes a subdelegation to a private
party, and the SEC lacks the express statutory authorization
required to make such a subdelegation; and (2) because Congress, and
not an administrative agency, is the proper body to make delegations
of authority to international organizations. 17 Therefore, this Note
also asserts that in order to validly recognize IASB as an official
accounting standard-setter in the U.S., Congress must grant the SEC
explicit authorization to make that recognition. If Congress does not
give such specific authorization, the SEC's recognition of IFRS is
likely reviewable in federal court.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the history of the
SEC, its delegations of the accounting rulemaking power to various
organizations (including FASB, the current U.S.-based standardsetter), and the history of FASB and IASB, including the procedures
used by both organizations in promulgating new accounting
standards. Part III places the SEC's outsourcing of accounting
rulemaking in the context of subdelegation and discusses both
explicit and inherent limitations on the SEC's ability to make such
subdelegations. Part IV discusses constitutional and policy-related
limitations on the federal government's ability to delegate its powers
to international or foreign-based organizations, with a particular
focus on the SEC and IASB. Part V applies the subdelegation and the
international delegation frameworks to the current SEC-IASB
relationship and makes specific recommendations, and Part VI
concludes with a few general observations.

II. THE HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING RULEMAKING UNDER U.S.
SECURITIES LAWS

A. The History of the SEC and Its Role as Accounting
Standard-Setter
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the '34 Act)18 established
the SEC after the stock market crash of October 1929, which
"dramatized the need for federal intervention in establishing and
maintaining higher standards of business conduct in the capital
markets."'19
Indeed, one major cause of the crash was that
government "proposals . . . to require financial disclosure . . . were

17.
18.

See discussion infra Parts III, IV.A.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2008).

19.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, "... . GOOD PEOPLE, IMPORTANT PROBLEMS AND
WORKABLE LAWS": 50 YEARS OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 7
(1984) [hereinafter 50 YEARS].
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never seriously pursued. '20 The first set of federal securities laws
was passed as the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act) and was for a
21
short time administered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
with the SEC taking over the FTC's securities-related duties upon the
passage of the '34 Act (although not without some public backlash). 22
Among the powers conferred upon the SEC by the '33 and '34 Acts (as
amended) are the powers to make "rules and regulations governing
registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of
securities and issuers," 23 to exempt certain classes of securities from
federal reporting requirements, 24 and to make rules requiring
disclosure of specific information from companies who wish to have
their securities listed on a national securities exchange. 25
The SEC also has the authority "to prescribe ... the methods to
be followed in the preparation of accounts," 26 or, in other words, to
create what is known today as GAAP. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 amended Section 19 of the '33 Act to allow the SEC to
subdelegate this rulemaking authority by "recogniz[ing], as 'generally
accepted' for purposes of the securities laws, any accounting
principles established by a standard setting body" that meets certain
criteria. 2 7 These criteria are: (1) that the body is "organized as a
private entity"; (2) that the body has "a board of trustees ... serving
in the public interest," with limitations placed on the trustees'
connections to registered public accounting firms; (3) that the body is
funded under the guidelines set out in Section 109 of the SarbanesOxley Act; 28 (4) that the body "has adopted procedures to ensure

20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 9. The grants of power made to "the Commission" in the '33 Act were
thus originally made to the Federal Trade Commission and were transferred upon the
creation of the SEC. Id. at 10. Interestingly, § 2 of the '33 Act was not amended to read
"[t]he term 'Commission' means the Securities and Exchange Commission," as opposed
to "Federal Trade Commission," until 1987. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(5) (2008); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 100-181, sec. 201, § 2(5), 101 Stat.
1240 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(5) (2008)).
22.
Publications such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal
referred to the '34 Act as "autocratic meddling" and "social control," respectively. 50
YEARS, supra note 19, at 9.
23.
Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2008).
24.
Id. § 3(b)-(c).
25.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1) (2008).
26.
Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2008).
27.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (2008). The language
added by § 108 became the current § 19(b) of the '33 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)). Although
the language in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that the SEC grants recognition to
accounting principles established by a standard-setting organization and not to the
organization itself, this Note treats recognition of accounting standards and recognition
of the standard-setting organization as identical and therefore interchangeable.
28.
The funding guidelines established by § 109 are minimal, essentially
requiring only that a fiscal year budget be approved at least one month before the start
of the fiscal year, and that the organization be funded by an "accounting support fee"
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prompt consideration . . . of changes to accounting principles
necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues"; (5) that the body
considers both "the need to keep standards current in order to reflect
changes in the business environment" and "the extent to which
international convergence on high quality accounting standards is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection
of investors"; and (6) that the SEC determines that the body "is
capable of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial
29
reporting and the protection of investors under the securities laws."
Interestingly, Congress first granted explicit statutory
authorization of the SEC's subdelegation of accounting rulemaking
authority in 2002, despite the fact that the SEC had subdelegated
this authority since 1938.30 At that time, the SEC recognized the
American Institute of Accountants (currently known as the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or AICPA) as the first
surrogate accounting standard-setter. The American Institute of
Accountants in turn created the Committee on Accounting Procedure
specifically to serve as the standard-setting body. 3 1 In 1959, due to
demands for "more uniformity and specificity" in accounting
practices, the AICPA replaced the Committee on Accounting
Procedure with the Accounting Principles Board (APB). 32 In time,
however, "the flow of new accounting issues outstripped the APB's
33
capacity," and the APB lost stature among accounting practitioners.

collected from securities issuers, as opposed to donations or other private contributions.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109(b), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b), (e) (2008).
These six criteria are found in Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v),
29.
(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v), (b)(1)(B) (2008).

30.
See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 987 (2005)
(pointing to a 1938 SEC release as the first occasion on which the Commission
"articulated its policy of private-sector delegation"). Courts have held that
"subdelegations to outside [nongovernmental] parties are assumed to be improper
absent an affirmative showing of congressional authorization," a limitation which this
Note discusses more thoroughly in Part III. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554,
565 (D.C. Cir. 2004). However, previous challenges to the "constitutionality of [the
SEC's] delegation" of accounting rulemaking authority have been "without success."
Nagy, supra, at 987. For one example of such an unsuccessful challenge, see Arthur
Andersen & Co. v. SEC, No. 76C-2832, 1978 WL 1073, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1978),
where the court ruled that plaintiff accounting firm lacked standing to challenge the
subdelegation because the firm failed to "allege harm from compliance [with an
accounting principle promulgated by FASB] as well as the threat of legal sanctions
from noncompliance." This Note does not address the question of whether the SEC's
original delegation of authority to FASB was legally valid, given that Congress has
finally given explicit statutory authorization for this delegation (despite the troubling
sixty-four-year gap noted above). This Note addresses only the question of whether
such a delegation to IASB would be valid.
William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance:A New Look at
31.
the FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 11-12 (2007).
Id. at 12.
32.
33.
Id.
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The failure of the APB led the AICPA to conclude that
"independence" and "better constituent representation" were required
in a new standard-setter, and private negotiations led to the
formation of FASB in 1973. 34 The SEC wasted little time in
recognizing FASB as the new authorized accounting standardsetter. 35 Although the SEC retains the power to engage in accounting
rulemaking itself, it seldom overrules or refuses to recognize FASB
pronouncements
or
makes
any
substantive
accounting
36
pronouncements of its own.
B. The History and Standard-SettingProceduresof FASB
In 1973, FASB was organized under the direction of the
Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF).37
FAF was originally
designated as the standard-setter successor to the APB, and FAF in
turn delegated the standard-setting authority to a full-time, seven
member board known as FASB. 38 This structure allowed FASB to
"act more quickly" than the twenty-one member, part-time APB. 39 In
delegating its standard-setting power to FASB, FAF gave FASB "no
substantive mandate on which to draw in drafting standards," but
"left this constitutional task to the agency itself. ' 40 As a result, "[t]he

34.
Id. at 13.
35.
Id. The SEC recognized FASB as the authorized standard-setter by stating
that "principles, standards and practices promulgated by the FASB . . . will be
considered by the Commission as having substantial authoritative support, and those
contrary to such FASB promulgations will be considered to have no such support."
Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles
and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 1973 WL 149263, at *2 (Dec. 20,
1973) [hereinafter Statement of Policy]. The phrase "substantial authoritative support"
refers to Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No.
4, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,005, at 72,005 (Apr. 25,
1938), wherein the SEC stated that "[i]n
cases where financial statements . . . are
prepared in accordance with accounting principles for which there is no substantial
authoritative support, such financial statements will be presumed to be misleading or
inaccurate." (emphasis added).
36.
See Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the
Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 868 & n.120 (2005) (providing an example
of the SEC overruling FASB in its "approach to income recognition in the oil and gas
industry," but noting that after its recognition of FASB, the SEC "rarely exercised its
powers to establish accounting principles directly"). The SEC does issue Staff
Accounting Bulletins (SABs); however, "[s]tatements in SABs are not rules or
interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published as bearing the Commission's
official approval," but merely "provide[] the staffs views" on various accounting
principles. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Staff Releases Accounting
Bulletin for Written Loan Commitments Recorded at Fair Value Under GAAP (Nov. 5,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-225.htm.
37.
Fin. Accounting Found., Financial Accounting Foundation Overview,
http://www.fasb.org/faf/fafinfo.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
38.
Bratton, supra note 31, at 14.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 15.
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early FASB responded with the Conceptual Framework, a series of
[six] statements intended to provide a unified theoretical basis from
which to articulate standards," a process which took twelve years to
41
complete.
FASB also adopted Rules of Procedure (often referred to as
FASB's "due process") as a framework for its standard-setting
process. 42 FASB claims that "[tihis process was modeled on the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act and, in several respects, is
more demanding. '4 3 Indeed, some scholars have agreed that in
recent years "changes in FASB's procedures have further enshrined
many of the norms and practices of administrative law within this
body of private governance. '4 4 The process can be broken down into
eight main steps, although "[n]ot all of the steps may be necessary"
for every project, and "[m]any other steps are followed during the
course of the project that are not specifically required by the Board's
Rules of Procedure. '45 These steps include holding public board
meetings, issuing "Exposure Drafts," soliciting public comments on
these drafts, and voting by simple majority to issue new "Standards"
''
or "Interpretations. 46
In recent years, FASB has become increasingly concerned with
the development of international accounting standards and its effect
on U.S. capital markets and accounting practices, and FASB has
consistently favored the development of one internationally
recognized set of accounting standards. 47 In October 2002, FASB and
IASB jointly released a memorandum of understanding known as the
"Norwalk Agreement," which "mark[ed] a significant step toward
formalizing their commitment to the convergence of U.S. and
international accounting standards. ' 48
In this document, both
organizations committed to developing "high-quality, compatible
accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and cross-

41.
Id. at 15 & n.103.
42.
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Due Process Steps Required by the
Rules of Procedure, http://www.fasb.org/facts/due-process.shtml (last visited Feb. 17,
2009) [hereinafter FASB Due Process].
43.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB-THE MISSION OF
THE FINANCIAL STANDARDS ACCOUNTING BOARD (2007), http://www.fasb.org/facts/facts_

about fasb.pdf.
44.
Walter Mattli & Tim Biithe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225,
239 (2005).
45.
FASB Due Process, supra note 42.
46.
Id.
47.
See Robert H. Herz & Kimberley R. Petrone, InternationalConvergence of
Accounting Standards:Perspectives from the FASB on Challenges and Opportunities,
25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 631,

631-32 (2005) ("FASB has pursued international

convergence' for almost half of its more than thirty year existence.").
48.
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Convergence with the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), http://www.fasb.org/intl/convergenceiasb.shtml
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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border financial reporting" and "mak[ing] their existing financial
reporting standards fully compatible as soon as is practicable. '49 In
2007, FASB Chairman Robert Herz told a Senate subcommittee that
FASB agrees with the SEC that "a widely used single set of high
quality international accounting standards for listed companies
would benefit the global capital markets and investors," 50 and FASB
responded to an SEC request for public comment 51 by stating that
"[i]nvestors would be better served if all U.S. public companies used
accounting standards promulgated by a single global standard setter
as the basis for preparing their financial reports," but still preferring
52
not to give companies a choice between U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
C. The History and Standard-SettingProceduresof lASB
Although IASB was created in 2001, 53 its history extends back to
1973 when its overseer, the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC), was founded in London. 54 IASC was founded by
the national accounting organizations of nine countries (including the
U.S. 55) as "a vehicle for harmonizing accounting practices throughout
the world. '56 "In the 1990s, the IASC shifted its focus from . . .
harmonizing accounting standards throughout the world to ... being
the primary international accounting standard setter. '5 7 However, in
shifting its focus, the IASC, which had previously been comprised of
58
members of the national accounting bodies of its member states,
had to choose between adopting "an independence model based on
accounting standards set by highly qualified full-time individuals who

49.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. & INT'L AccOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: "THE NORWALK AGREEMENT" 1 (2002), available at

http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf.
50.
InternationalAccounting Standards:Opportunities, Challenges, and Global
Convergence Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 3
(2007) (statement of Robert H. Herz, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards
Board), available at http://www.fasb.org/testimonyllO-24-07-prepared-statement.pdf.
51.
2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,601.
52.
Letter from Robert E. Denham, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Found. &
Robert H. Herz, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., to Nancy M. Morris, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.fasb.org/FASB-FAFResponse_
SECReleasesmsw.pdf.
53.
INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., IASB AND THE ISAC FOUNDATION: WHO
WE ARE AND WHAT WE Do, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0A5A767C-

E7DE-49E5-8B12-499F62F8870C/O/WhoWeAreFinall2508.pdf

[hereinafter IASB AND

THE IASC FOUNDATION].

54.

David S. Ruder et al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards:

Convergence and Independence, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 513, 519 (2005).
55.
IASB AND THE IASC FOUNDATION, supra note 53.

56.
57.
58.

Ruder et al., supra note 54, at 519.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 526.
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serve the public interest" and "a representativeness model based on
an international organization composed of country representatives." 59
The IASC chose a hybrid of both models, wherein the IASB would
function as an independent body under the oversight of the IASC,
which was to be geographically representative. 60 The organization of
the IASB as the new international standard-setter was completed on
April 1, 2001.61 The IASB consists of twelve full-time and two parttime members whom the IASC chooses by virtue of "professional
competence and practical experience" and who are required to "meet
appropriate guidelines of independence. '6 2 Unlike FASB, which is
funded through the collection of fees from securities issuers, IASB is a
Since its inception, IASB's
privately funded organization. 63
as "[n]early 100
well-received,
promulgation of IFRS has been
or
are converging
IFRSs
use
of
countries now require or permit the
Board's
Standards
Accounting
International
the
with
64
standards."
(IASB)
Although not identical to the "due process" system of FASB's, the
IASB's process is quite similar. The procedure for introducing a new
IFRS is broken down into six steps: (1) "Setting the agenda," or
determining which projects IASB will take on; (2) "Project planning,"
including working jointly with other standard-setting organizations;
(3) "Development and publication of a discussion paper" as "a vehicle
to explain the issue and solicit early comments from constituents";
(4) "Development and publication of an exposure draft," "IASB's main
vehicle for consulting the public"; (5) "Development and publication of
an IFRS," containing revisions after public comments have been
received; and (6) "Procedures after an IFRS is issued," including

59.
60.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.

61.

IASB AND THE IASC FOUNDATION, supranote 53.

62.
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation Constitution
18-19, June 21, 2005, available at http://www.iasb.org/NRlrdonlyres/1904AEEE3554-49C6-BD96-A4611A6964BE/O/IASCFoundationConstitution2.pdf.
Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., Funding, http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/
63.
About+the+IASC+FoundationlFunding.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009); see also 2007
Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,604 (acknowledging IASB's "privately funded"
status).
the
World,
Around
IFRSs
Bd.,
Standards
Int'l
Accounting
64.
(last
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+the+IASB/IFRSs+around+the+world.htm
visited Feb. 17, 2009). Among the countries currently utilizing IFRS are all member
states of the European Union. See 2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,602 ("The
European Union . . . has, under a regulation adopted in 2002, required companies
incorporated in its Member States and whose securities are listed on an EU-regulated
market to report their consolidated financial statements using endorsed IFRS
beginning in 2005.").
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review of its application.6 5 Not all of these steps are mandatory in
66
every IASB project.
IASB has made a relationship with FASB and the convergence of
U.S. and international accounting standards one of its top
priorities. 67 The current IASB agenda is structured around the
agency's commitment to convergence with U.S. GAAP, 68 and IASB
has decided not to require companies to apply new IFRS, or
amendments to existing IFRS, until 200969 (SEC Chairman Cox's
previously stated target year for eliminating the reconciliation
70
requirement from IFRS to U.S. GAAP).
The validity of any recognition by the SEC of accounting
standards promulgated by IASB as binding under federal securities
law is subject to two potential limitations: the limitations on an
administrative agency's ability to subdelegate its own authority, and
the U.S. government's ability to delegate its authority to an
71
international organization.

65.
INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND., DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK
FOR THE IASB 7-13 (2006), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/7D97095E96FD-4FlF-B7F2-366527CB4FA7/0/DueProcessHandbook.pdf.
66.
Compare id. at 10 ("[A] discussion paper is not a mandatory step in... due
process."), with id. at 11 ("Publication of an exposure draft is a mandatory step in due
process.").
67.
See Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., Memorandum of Understanding with
the FASB, http://www.iasb.org/Current+ProjectsfMemorandum+of+Understanding+
with+the+FASB.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) ("A common set of high quality global
standards remains the long-term strategic priority of both the FASB and the IASB.").
68.
See Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Work Plan, http://www.iasb.org/
Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/IASB+Work+Plan.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009)
("The Work Plan ... reflects the objectives of the Memorandum of Understanding with
the FASB .... ").
69.
Press Release, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Takes Steps to Assist
Adoption of IFRSs and Reinforce Consultation No New IFRSs Effective Until 2009
(July 24, 2006), available at http://www.iasb.org/News/Press+Releases/IASB+takes+
steps+to+assist+adoption+of+IFRSs+and+reinforce+consultation+No+new+IFRSs+effe
ctive+until.htm.
70.
Cox-McCreevy Statement, supra note 8.
71.
See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting
that "general delegation of decision-making authority to a federal administrative
agency does not, in the ordinary course of things, include the power to subdelegate that
authority beyond federal subordinates"); infra Part IV.A.
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III. SUBDELEGATION

A. General Limitationson the Ability of Government Branches and
Agencies to Subdelegate Their Authority to PrivateParties
1.

Delegation and Subdelegation in Administrative Law

Courts have long recognized that Congress cannot abdicate or
delegate to another governmental branch or entity its "essential
legislative functions,"7 2 a prohibition known as the "nondelegation
doctrine. '7 3 That prohibition, however, does not prevent Congress
from "obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches." 74 Indeed,
to date, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a delegation of
congressional power excessive and in violation of the nondelegation
doctrine in only two cases, both in 1935. 75 "[I]n our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives. '76
Therefore,
Congress may delegate authority short of purely legislative authority,
usually either to Cabinet-level Executive departments or to
administrative agencies, by "lay[ing] down . . . an intelligible
principle" which guides an agency in its exercise of the delegated
authority. 77 Generally, all agency activities are classified as either
rulemaking or adjudicatory in nature. 78 An agency's exercise of its
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority is governed primarily by the
79
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
Once Congress has made a valid delegation of authority, the
empowered department or agency can often further delegate that
authority, an action known as "subdelegation." Perhaps the most
common form of subdelegation occurs when an agency that has been
given specific authority by Congress allows an individual employee or
division of the agency to exercise that authority on the entire agency's
behalf.80 That an agency may make such a subdelegation seems only

72.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
73.
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
74.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
75.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). Those two cases
were A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp, 295 U.S. at 541-42, and Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430-33 (1935).
76.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
77.
Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 472.
78.
William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 357 (2000).
79.
Rulemaking activities are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2007), and
adjudicatory activities are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2007).
80.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(a) (2008)
(allowing the SEC to "delegate ...any of its functions to a division of the Commission,
an individual Commissioner, an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee
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logical because part of Congress's intent in delegating some of its
81
power to an agency is to promote governmental efficiency.
Achieving such efficiency would be impossible if the entirety of the
agency were required to make every decision and take every action.
Indeed, "[w]hen a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or
agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is
presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary
congressional intent," even without a statutory provision explicitly
82
authorizing the subdelegation.
Different questions arise, however, when an agency subdelegates
its power not to a subordinate, but to a nongovernmental actor.
These questions might involve: (1) the fairness and impartiality of the
actor exercising the subdelegated authority; (2) the reasons that the
agency gave in justifying its subdelegation; (3) the factors that the
agency considered in choosing a private actor to whom to subdelegate
its authority; and (4) the efficiency with which the agency and the
private actor work, both in establishing the original subdelegation
and in the exercise of the authority once the original subdelegation is
complete. Although many of these concerns might be considered
purely practical, scholars have questioned whether these kinds of
83
relationships might also pose constitutional problems.
2.

U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC: Legal Limitations on Subdelegation

The D.C. Circuit's 2004 decision in U.S. Telecom Association v.
Federal Communications Commission is perhaps the most important
recent decision regarding the limitations on the ability of a
government agency to subdelegate its authority to nongovernmental
actors. U.S. Telecom involved efforts by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to increase competition in telecommunication
markets by requiring "incumbent" local telephone companies to make
their "network elements" available to companies who wished to

board"); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 169 (1991) (upholding a delegation by
the Attorney General to the Drug Enforcement Agency, an agency within the
Department of Justice, of the Attorney General's power to define specific drugs as
"controlled substances" for purposes of federal criminal law).
81.
See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54
UCLA L. REV. 117, 121 (2006) ("[A]gency discretion may enhance the efficiency and
responsiveness of public governance ....
").
82.
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
83.
See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 83-84 (1997) ("Institutional arrangements that empower private
groups to make public policy might be unconstitutional at worst, and corrode
legitimacy at best."); Jim Rossi, Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial
Review of State Regulatory Inaction, 93 IOWA L. REV. 185, 223 (2007) ("Administrative
law has long recognized . . . that delegations of authority to private entities also
present a unique set of problems-bordering, at some level, on the unconstitutional.").
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compete with the incumbents, a process known as "unbundling."8 4 In
deciding which network elements were to be made available to
potential competitors in the unbundling process, a federal statute
directed the FCC to "consider, at a minimum, whether. . . the failure
to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability"
of the potential competitor to provide the services it sought to
provide. 8 5
However, because the question of impairment was
necessarily linked to the unique characteristics of individual
markets,8 6 the FCC adopted a rule allowing state regulatory
commissions, under certain circumstances, to make determinations
regarding which network elements new competitors should have
access to "under a purported delegation of the [FCC's] own
authority."8 7 Several incumbent local telephone companies appealed
the FCC's order as contrary to previous directives the D.C. Circuit
88
had given to the FCC.
On review, the D.C. Circuit held that "the [FCC's] subdelegation
of authority to the state commissions" was unlawful.8 9 The court held
that whereas subdelegations of administrative authority to federal
subordinates carry a presumption of validity, no such presumption
exists where the subdelegation is made to an actor outside of the
federal government; in such a case, the validity of the subdelegation
requires "an affirmative showing of congressional authorization." 90
The court described this distinction as "entirely sensible":
When an agency delegates authority to its subordinate, responsibilityand thus accountability-clearly remain with the federal agency. But
when an agency delegates power to outside parties, lines of
accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic check
on government decision-making ....
Also, delegation to outside entities
increases the risk that these parties will not share the agency's
"national vision and perspective," . . . and thus may pursue goals
inconsistent with those of the agency and the underlying statutory
91
scheme.

The court also rejected the FCC's argument that its decision to
subdelegate to the state regulatory commissions deserved Chevron
deference because "[a] general delegation of decision-making
authority to a federal administrative agency does not, in the ordinary

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 561.
Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2004)).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565-66.
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course of things, include the power to subdelegate that authority
92
beyond federal subordinates.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in U.S. Telecom emphasized the
importance of maintaining some semblance of democracy and
"representativeness" in the actions taken by administrative
agencies-bodies which have long been criticized as inherently
undemocratic. 9 3 Placing limits on an agency's ability to subdelegate
its authority works to minimize "conflicts of interest" and
simultaneously ensures that "oversight and review" of the
94
establishment of binding agency policy remain within the agency
and with individuals within the agency who are politically
accountable (or at least more so than members of a private body to
whom authority would be subdelegated).
B. Recognition of Industry StandardsEstablished
by a Nongovernmental Entity as a Form of
Subdelegation
Given the limitations on private actor subdelegation articulated
in U.S. Telecom, defining "subdelegation" becomes a vital task. In the
context of the SEC, FASB, and accounting rulemaking authority, the
question could be phrased as such: Does the recognition of industry
standards by an administrative agency constitute a subdelegation of
that agency's authority? There are at least three good reasons to
answer that question in the affirmative, at least with regards to the
SEC's recognition of accounting standards promulgated by FASB,
and, by extension, any subsequent recognition of IFRS promulgated
by IASB.

92.
Id. at 566. The term "Chevron deference" is derived from Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), where the
Court stated that "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency," thus
showing deference to the agency's interpretations of the statutes which guide and
empower it.
93.
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711,
711-12 (2001) ("In contemporary constitutional and administrative law scholarship,
the bureaucracy has been viewed as . . . an abandonment of our democratically based
commitments to popular sovereignty and public accountability.").
94.
Brenda Lindlief Hall, Subdelegation of Authority Under the Endangered
Species Act: SecretarialAuthority to Subdelegate His Duties to a Citizen Management
Committee as Proposed for the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Grizzly Bear
Reintroduction, 20 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 81, 92 (1999).
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1.

Recognition of Externally Created Accounting Standards as a
Subdelegation of the SEC's Authority

a.

"Passing of Power"

The first ground for defining the SEC's recognition of the validity
of FASB's accounting standards as a subdelegation is that the
relationship constitutes the kind of "passing of power" inherent in
any agency delegation or subdelegation. 95 To understand the concept
of delegation as a "passing of power," it is necessary first to
understand that, at least with regards to the exercise of rulemaking
authority, 96 an agency only possesses and can only exercise as much
power as is originally delegated to it by Congress. 97 This initial
"passing of power" from Congress to the administrative agency is
then analogous to any subsequent transfer of authority by the agency
to a third party. Just as the agency's exercise of authority is bounded
by Congress's original grant, a third party's exercise of that same
authority is bounded by the agency's subsequent grant.
If an agency delegation or subdelegation is primarily
characterized by a "passing of power," then a recognition by the SEC
that accounting standards promulgated by either FASB or IASB are
binding under U.S. securities law certainly qualifies. The SEC was
originally granted authority by Congress to create substantive
accounting rules in the '33 Act. 98 Therefore, any authority on the
part of FASB or IASB to promulgate such binding accounting rules
would necessarily be derived from a "passing of power" by the SEC. 99

95.
I am indebted to Professor Lisa Bressman of Vanderbilt University Law
School for this formulation of the principle behind agency delegation. It is important to
note here that the words "delegation" and "subdelegation" may be used
interchangeably to describe the assignment of authority from the agency to the third
party, given that many other scholars and authors have used the terms
interchangeably.
96.
The Administrative Procedure Act defines rulemaking as "agency process
for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2007). A rule is
defined as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy." Id. § 551(4). Thus, rulemaking has been described as a "quasi-legislative
activity." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Accounting standards promulgated by FASB and recognized as authoritative by the
SEC certainly seem to fit the APA definition of a rule, as they are of "general . . .
applicability" as to issuers of securities and are designed to "implement, interpret, or
prescribe" federal securities law. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
97.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
98.
See supra notes 1, 25 and accompanying text.
99.
Interestingly, nowhere in the SEC's original recognition of FASB as the
authorized accounting standard-setter for purposes of federal securities law does the
SEC actually use the terms "delegate" or "delegation." Statement of Policy, supra note
35. In fact, in a later release, the SEC explicitly stated that "[t]he Commission's policy
recognizes that the FASB operates to establish accounting standards, but it does not
involve a delegation of the Commission's substantive rulemaking authority to the
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The fact that accounting standards promulgated by FASB currently
have the force of law, at least as to companies required to make
periodic filings under federal securities law,10 0 is evidenced by the
fact that "[t]he SEC has enforced [the federal securities laws] in
thousands of administrative proceedings and hundreds of federal
101
court cases asserting violations of GAAP."
b.

Previous Scholarly Work

The second reason, perhaps not controlling but still worth
considering, for defining the SEC-FASB relationship (as well as the
newly created SEC recognition of IFRS as created by IASB) as a
subdelegation is the fact that many legal scholars over the years have
characterized the recognition of FASB accounting standards as a
delegation by the SEC.10 2 In fact, some scholars have gone so far as
to imply that such a delegation constitutes a dereliction of the SEC's
duty to effectively regulate U.S. capital markets. 10 3 Although making
such a judgment falls beyond the scope of this Note, there seems to be
some consensus among scholars familiar with these issues that the
SEC has delegated at least some portion of its authority to FASB.
c.

Comparisons to Other Delegations

The third reason for finding that the SEC-FASB, and the new
SEC-IASB, recognition constitutes a delegation of the SEC's
rulemaking authority is that the relationship between the two parties
is at least somewhat analogous to similar relationships in other areas

FASB." Accounting Practices-Oil and Gas Producers, Solicitation of Comments,
Securities Act Release No. 5892, Exchange Act Release No. 20,337, Investment Act
Release No. 14,305 (Dec. 22, 1977).
100.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2008)
(requiring issuers of securities registered with the SEC to provide annual and
quarterly reports "as the Commission may prescribe").
101.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (2005). Some argue
that the accounting principles which comprise GAAP are not laws but merely "business
practices." Alan Rappeport, Marketing GAAP: Unlike FASB's Avators, International
FinancialReporting Standards May Be Catching on Because Their CreatorsAre Super
Sellers, CFO, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.cfo.comlarticle.cfm/10519396?f=search.
However, given the SEC's propensity for instituting litigation or administrative action
as a result of GAAP violations by public companies, as noted in Cunningham supra, it
is clear that no matter how GAAP is defined, the SEC imposes serious legal
consequences on public companies who diverge from GAAP's prescribed standards.
102.
See, e.g., Bratton, iupra note 31, at 27; Nagy, supra note 30, at 985 (using
the term "delegate" to describe the SEC's recognition of FASB and previous accounting
standard-setters).
103.
See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 813, 825 (2003) (referring to the SEC's decision to recognize industry-established
accounting standards as "[throwing] in the towel").
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of administrative law that have been characterized as delegations.
Most notably, the relationship bears a striking resemblance to the
delegation of authority the Supreme Court found excessive and thus
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.10 4 In Schechter,
Congress had called for the creation of "codes of fair competition" to
be created by the President under the National Industrial Recovery
Act.10 5 The President's code for the poultry industry provided for the
establishment of an 'industry advisory committee,' to be selected by
trade associations and members of the industry" in order to assist in
the administration of the code.1 0 6 In declaring the delegation of
congressional authority excessive, the Court queried, "Wlould it be
seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative
authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to
empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent
'10 7
for ... their trade or industries?
This Note does not argue that Schechter dictates that the
promulgation of binding accounting rules by FASB should be held
unconstitutional or an excessive delegation of legislative authority.
The problem in Schechter was not that a delegation was made to an
industrial committee, but that the delegation was overbroad and
constituted a transfer of purely legislative authority which only
Congress can exercise. 10 8 The critical point that Schechter makes for
the purpose of this Note is that the President's (and, by extension,
Congress') recognition of standards created by a trade or industry
group was in fact a delegation.' 0 9
2.

Delegation vs. Incorporation

However, not all agency recognition of industry standards could
properly be referred to as a "delegation" or "subdelegation"; in many
cases, such recognition would more correctly be labeled as
"incorporation."'11 0 One case that involved such an incorporation by a
government agency, and that can be distinguished in several ways
from the relationship between SEC and FASB, is Noblecraft
Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor.111 In Noblecraft, lumber
processors appealed citations by the Occupational Safety and Health

104.
105.
(1935).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
(referring
published
111.

See supra text accompanying notes 72-73, 76.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22
Id. at 524.
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 72, 75 and accompanying text.
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
See Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1324 (6th Cir. 1992)
to adoption by U.S. Department of Transportation of industry standards
by the Compressed Gas Association as "incorporation").
Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v Sec'y of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Administration (OSHA) for violations of various safety standards. 112
The standards, promulgated by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), were adopted by the Secretary as "national
consensus standard[s]" as authorized by applicable federal law. 113 On
review, the Ninth Circuit upheld the standards against a challenge to
their validity, stating that OSHA's recognition of the standards did
114
not constitute an "undue delegation of power."'
There are two important factors which distinguish OSHA's
acceptance of the ANSI standard in Noblecraft, which could correctly
be considered one of "incorporation,"' 15 from the SEC's acceptance of
accounting standards promulgated by FASB (or, given recent
developments, IASB). First, the court in Noblecraft explicitly stated
that OSHA "selected among the ANSI standards with apparent
discrimination." 116 In contrast, not only has the SEC officially
recognized as authoritative essentially all of the accounting standards
promulgated by FASB since its inception in 1973,117 but the SEC's
recognition of FASB as an authorized standard-setter essentially
grants
authoritative
status
to
FASB
pronouncements
prospectively. 11 8 Second, the Noblecraft court noted that in accepting
the ANSI standard, the Secretary of Labor "did not comply with the
notice and hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act"
only because the statute directing the Secretary to adopt "national
consensus standard[s]" authorized him to do so without following

112.
Id. at 201.
113.
Id. at 202.
114.
Id. at 203.
115.
There seems to be no widely recognized legal definition for "incorporation"
in the context of a government agency adopting an industry standard for official use.
Although Hurt, 956 F.2d 1319, is short on details, the "incorporation" discussed in Hurt
seems to have involved (1) an industry standard promulgated primarily for industry as
opposed to governmental use that was (2) adopted for governmental use through
statutorily prescribed rulemaking procedures. For an example of the Department of
Transportation's process of incorporating industry standards, as in Hurt, see Rules and
Regulations, Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, 73 Fed. Reg. 4699, 4700 (Jan. 28, 2008) (containing a final rule
"[u]pdating provisions incorporating consensus standards issued by the .
Compressed Gas Association," the standard-setting body in Hurt, in response to a
"notice of proposed rulemaking" issued by the Department). Noblecraft also involved
the two elements noted above.
116.
Noblecraft, 614 F.2d at 203.
117.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Here it should be noted that
FASB does not promulgate GAAP in its entirety, as there are other bodies (including
the SEC and the accounting standard-setters which predated FASB) that are or were
involved in the development of the body of accounting standards properly known as
GAAP. Bolt v. Merrimack Pharm., Inc., 503 F.3d 913, 917 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007). However,
FASB pronouncements in some form or another are found in all of the "five categories
in the GAAP hierarchy" established by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. Id.
118.
Statement of Policy, supranote 35, at 1.
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normal APA requirements. 1 19 The court's statement suggests that
without statutory authorization to circumvent regular notice-andcomment requirements, any "incorporation" of industry standards by
an agency must be done in accordance with these requirements.
However, the SEC does not utilize APA-required notice-and-comment
procedures when it accepts a new FASB accounting standard as
authoritative. 120 And despite the fact that FASB follows its own
relatively stringent set of due process standards in developing new
accounting rules, 121 there is no indication that the SEC can assign or
outsource to FASB the undertaking of any rulemaking procedures the
APA would impose upon the SEC. 12 2 This seems to indicate that the
SEC has simply delegated its rulemaking authority to FASB, as
opposed to viewing FASB promulgations as recommendations or
submissions and then "incorporating" them through regular noticeand-comment procedures.

119.
Noblecraft, 614 F.2d at 202. Under most circumstances, the APA dictates
that when agencies engage in rulernaking activities, they must observe such procedural
requirements as publishing notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and
"giv[ing] interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2008). This
process is known as "notice-and-comment rulemaking." United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
120.
See General Revision of Regulation S-X, Securities Act Release No. 6233,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,116, Investment Company Act Release No. 11,325, 20
SEC Docket 1356 (Sept. 2, 1980) (contrasting the possibility of an SEC "decision to
require a particular method of accounting through rulemaking" with "the basic policy
of relying on the FASB for leadership in establishing financial accounting and
reporting standards").
121.
See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
122.
There seems to be no statutory language, either in the '33 Act (giving the
SEC authority to promulgate substantive accounting rules) or in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (allowing the SEC to recognize an outside standard-setter), which would allow the
SEC either to disregard or to outsource its APA-dictated rulemaking requirements. The
best argument for such a stance would be that Sarbanes-Oxley allows the SEC to
"recognize" accounting standards issued by an authorized standard-setter as "generally
accepted" and makes no mention of regular notice-and-comment or other rulemaking
procedures, but this argument is hardly convincing. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77s(b) (2009). Generally, cases such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. and
U.S. Telecom Ass'n seem to suggest the opposite view-that the ability to delegate
powers and responsibilities normally possessed by the federal government to private
parties would result in a dearth of public accountability. See Jody Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms Through Privatization,116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1304 (2003) ("Public
law scholars worry that privatization may enable government to avoid its traditional
legal obligations, leading to an erosion of public law norms and a systematic failure of
public accountability."). Again, it is important to note that questions regarding the
validity of the SEC's current delegation to FASB are beyond the scope of this Note,
except to the extent that a delegation to IASB poses similar questions.
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C. Specific Limitations on the SEC's Ability to Subdelegate
Accounting Rulemaking Authority
If the SEC's recognition of accounting standards established by
outside bodies is a subdelegation of its authority to create substantive
accounting rules under the '33 Act, then the SEC's ability to make
such subdelegations must be subject to certain limitations. The most
important limitation is emphasized in U.S. Telecom: the SEC cannot
subdelegate its authority to a private party absent express
123
Congressional authorization.
In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress set forth six criteria
that an organization must meet before the SEC can deem accounting
standards promulgated by that organization authoritative. 124 Soon
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law, and after FASB
made changes to its own funding mechanism, 125 the SEC found that
FASB met these six criteria and reaffirmed FASB's status as the
preeminent accounting standard-setter. 126 Looking forward, a vital
question should now be asked: Does the IASB meet all six necessary
criteria? Currently, the answer appears to be no.
IASB definitely falls short of at least one of the standards set by
Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: that an organization
promulgating accounting standards must be publicly funded. The
SEC acknowledges that IASB has been funded "largely through
voluntary contributions from companies, accounting firms,
international organizations and central banks. '127 In the context of
promulgating rules which can be binding on a wide swath of private
actors in all parts of the world, the problem with such a financing
scheme is that "[p]rivate funding can create real or apparent conflicts,
if donors contribute believing the board will return the favor by
passing accounting standards that they prefer. [Sarbanes-Oxley's]
funding provision eliminated that problem for FASB. Recognizing
IASB despite that problem reintroduces a concern that Congress
sought to eliminate.' 128
The requirement for public funding is
particularly noteworthy because at the time the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

123.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
124.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
125.
Previously, FAF was responsible for funding FASB, and the change to
public funding was made pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley. Commission Statement of Policy
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter,
Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,028, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,335 (May 1, 2003)
[hereinafter FASB Status Statement].
126.
Id. at 23,334.
127.
2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,605.
128.
Letter from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Professor of Law, George
Washington
Univ.,
to
Sec.
& Exch.
Comm'n
4
(Aug. 10,
2007),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-20-07/s72007-1.pdf [hereinafter Cunningham Letter].
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was passed, this was the only requirement that FASB did not already
meet under its pre-existing structure. 129 Thus, it would seem that
the potential for such conflicts of interest would cripple the hopes of
any organization that wished to be recognized as an authoritative
130
standard-setter under Sarbanes-Oxley.
Another of the six Sarbanes-Oxley criteria which IASB may or
may not meet is that a standard-setting body must be "capable of
improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial reporting and
the protection of investors under the securities laws.' 13 1 This seems
to be a factual determination which the SEC itself must make on a
case-by-case basis. 13 2 It does, however, seem potentially troubling
that the SEC itself, as opposed to Congress, has the final say as to
whether a standard-setting body can assist the SEC in its
"mission... to protect investors. ' 133 This is particularly true where
the SEC itself recognizes that its "relationship with the IASB . . .is
1 34
different and less direct than [its] oversight role with the FASB."'
Yet another criterion which IASB might not currently meet, but
which seems less consequential, is that changes to accounting
1 35
principles are adopted by a "majority vote of [the body's] members."'
While this seems to imply a simple majority, IASB currently approves
136
new accounting standards only by a 9/14 supermajority.
The fact that IASB currently fails to meet one or more of the six
criteria set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act would seem unavoidably
fatal to its efforts to secure authorized status as a standard-setter
from the SEC. However, given that these six criteria were "nearly
tailor made for FASB"137 (with the one exception of the public funding
requirement), yet another question seems to arise: Did Congress
actually intend that any organization meeting these six criteria be

129.

Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic

Appraisal of a

Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2008) [hereinafter

Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision].
130.
See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[An
agency may not delegate its public duties to private entities, . . . particularly private
entities whose objectivity may be questioned on grounds of conflict of interest.").
131.
Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(B) (2008).
132.
Cunningham Letter, supra note 128, at 4. The statutory provision explicitly
states that the SEC is to make the determination whether a standard-setting body
meets this criterion. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(B) (2008).
133.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How
the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/aboutlwhatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
134.
2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,605 (emphasis added).
135.
15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(A)(iv) (2008).
136.
Cunningham Letter, supra note 128, at 3 n.4. There is a good argument
that the supermajority voting rule is not so trivial, because "[t]he voting rule influences
the standard setting process and the probability that the body will have the capacity to
respond quickly and independently to emerging accounting issues." Cunningham,

SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supranote 129, at 22.
137.

Cunningham, SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note 129, at 21.
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recognizable by the SEC, or did Congress specifically have FASB in
mind when it set out these criteria? Given some of the legislative
history behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it seems that Congress
intended that FASB was to be the standard-setter the SEC officially
recognized:
Since 1973, the SEC has generally required public companies operating
in the United States to prepare their financial statements in accordance
with 'principles, standards, and practices' promulgated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board .... [The Sarbanes-Oxley Act] seeks to
138
formalize the SEC's reliance on the FASB ....

Thus, even in the event that IASB did meet all six of the criteria laid
down in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is unclear that Congress actually
intended to authorize the SEC to recognize any standard-setting body
other than FASB.
Given IASB's failure to meet all of the conditions necessary to be
recognized as an authoritative accounting standard-setter in the U.S.,
and given Congress's apparent intent that FASB was to be the sole
standard-setter recognized by the SEC, 139 it appears that the SEC
does not currently possess the necessary statutory authorization
under U.S. Telecom to delegate accounting rulemaking authority to
IASB by recognizing IFRS as authoritative under the federal
securities laws. The cure for this problem is simple: if Congress
agrees with the SEC's position that "having a widely used single set
of high quality globally accepted accounting standards . . . could
benefit ... investors," 140 Congress can by statute expressly authorize

the SEC to recognize IASB as an authoritative standard-setter, either
on the condition that they meet the six criteria set out in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or by scrapping or adjusting one or more of these
six criteria. However, even if Congress should give such express
authorization, one potential problem remains: Congress still would be
delegating some of its own authority to an internationally-based
organization to oversee U.S. capital markets and to protect investors
in those markets.

138. S.REP. No. 107-205, at 12-13 (2002).
139. Id. But see FASB Status Statement, supra note 125, at 23,333 n.5
(expressing the SEC's position that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "does not limit the number
of private-sector bodies the Commission may recognize").
140.
2007 Concept Release, supranote 6, at 45,604.
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INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION

A. ConstitutionalLimitations on Delegations of Power to
InternationalOrganizations
Although not an entirely new phenomenon, the concept of
nations delegating a portion of their authority or sovereignty to an
international organization seems recently to have gained increasing
momentum. 141 Considering the trend in this direction, it may as of
yet be impossible to ascertain or predict all of the complexities which
are or may be associated with such delegations. However, it is
essential to explore the positives and negatives associated with
international delegations if the full effect of the potential acceptance
of IFRS in the U.S. is to be determined.
At this point, it may be helpful to define the term "international
delegation." Bradley and Kelley define an "international delegation"
as "a grant of authority by two or more states to an international
body to make decisions or take actions," 142 and Swaine defines
"delegat[ions] to international institutions" as "vesting them with the
authority to develop binding rules."'1 43 These definitions comport
with the "passing of power" definition of delegation used in Part
111.144 Recognition by the SEC of IASB as an authorized accounting
standard-setter would surely meet these definitions. "Almost 100
countries now either require or allow the use of IFRS for the
preparation of financial statements by listed companies,"1145 (meeting
the first portion of the Bradley/Kelley definition), and given that the
SEC extend official recognition to IASB as it has to FASB, IFRS as
promulgated by IASB would presumably constitute the kind of
"substantial authoritative support"146 the SEC requires in financial
statements filed by registered securities issuers (and the
promulgation of IFRS would thus constitute "mak[ing] decisions or
tak[ing] actions," meeting the second portion of the Bradley/Kelley
definition).
Assuming that the SEC's potential recognition of IASB does
constitute an "international delegation," the first important question
to ask is whether there are any substantive constitutional limitations

See Curtis A. Bradley and Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International
141.
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2008) ("[S]tates increasingly find
international delegation useful in addressing the challenges associated with their
growing interdependence.").
142.
Id. at 2.
143.
Swaine, supra note 14, at 1494.
144.
See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.
145.
2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,602.
146.
See supra note 35; see also 2007 Concept Release, supra note 6, at 45,603
(soliciting public comments on whether the SEC "should accept financial statements
prepared in accordance with IFRS as published by the IASB from U.S. issuers").
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on the government's ability to make such a delegation. Appealing
directly to the text of the U.S. Constitution for an answer to this
question provides little help.
The most direct mention of
international law is found in Article I, where Congress is given the
authority to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of
Nations."'1 4 7 However, it is Congress, and not any international body,
that has the power to "define and punish" such offenses. 148 To
further complicate matters, "[t]he world of the Framers is not our
world. The modern administrative state in which we live is much
more complicated than the republic envisioned by the Framers. This
complexity has engendered an amount of lawmaking and legal
regulation inconceivable to the Framers."'149
And while the
Constitution assigns "[a]ll legislative [p]owers" to Congress, 150 that
exclusive grant of power has not stopped Congress from assigning
much of that power away. 151 Should the fact that the assignee is
based in London or Geneva make any difference?
The difficulty in resolving the constitutional questions posed by
international delegation has led legal scholars to reach very different
conclusions. Some scholars believe that international delegations are
not only constitutional but beneficial and even necessary for the
efficient operation of a national government in today's globalized
society. 152 Swaine argues that although "[i]nternational delegations
are demonstrably different from domestic delegations of legislative
authority," this does not necessarily mean that "international
delegations are an affront to the Constitution.' 15 3 Actually, Swaine
asserts, international delegations "promote[] a . . . specific
constitutional value: the diffusion of political authority prized by
federalism."'1 54 To Swaine, this does not mean that "international
delegations should always withstand constitutional scrutiny," as they
will still be subject to "the nondelegation and federalism doctrines,"
but simply that there should not exist a "preemptive, undifferentiated
1 55
constitutional objection to such activities."'

147.

U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl.
10.

148.
Although "[i]nternational law is part of our law," the "customs and usages
of civilized nations" are only controlling "where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900).
149.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEo. L.J. 523, 533 (1992).
150.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
151.
See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
152.
Neil S. Siegel, InternationalDelegations and the Values of Federalism, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 113 (2008).
153.
Swaine, supra note 14, at 1501.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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On the other hand, critics have come to doubt the
constitutionality of international delegations, or at least have
concluded that such delegations should be subject to a higher level of
scrutiny than other delegations. Ku argues that strict constitutional
formalism should apply to international delegations because they
"place an unusually heavy strain on the ideal of political
accountability that animates much of the Constitution's structural
design" and because "international organizations lack an independent
source of political legitimacy."' 156 Ku proceeds to argue that "[c]ourts
can and should play a role in policing the delegations of powers from
the federal government to international organizations" due to their
preexisting role as overseers of the process of delegating power within
157
the federal government.
Further complicating the question of the constitutionality of
international delegations is the existence of many different types of
such delegations. Bradley and Kelley point out eight categories of
international delegations: "legislative, adjudicative, regulatory,
monitoring and enforcement, agenda-setting, research and advice,
policy implementation, and redelegation.' 158 Given the fact that
international delegations can take so many different forms, it does
not seem prudent or even feasible to analyze all of these types of
On the
delegation under the same constitutional framework.
contrary, it seems that these types of delegation should be
individually analyzed under a framework similar to their domestic
analogues. For example, while a delegation by Congress of purely
legislative authority would be barred in both the domestic and the
international contexts by the nondelegation doctrine, 159 the
delegation of administrative authority (or "regulatory" authority, as
Bradley and Kelley refer to it)160 to an international organization
should be analyzed in much the same way as a domestic delegation of
administrative authority, but with an added, international
element.161

156.
Ku, supra note 14, at 77.
Id. at 77-78. It is important to point out, however, that federal courts'
157.
willingness to nullify federal delegations of power under the nondelegation doctrine is
almost nonexistent, and so Ku may be overstating the point. See Swaine, supra note
14, at 1544 (stating that the nondelegation doctrine "plainly lacks vitality" and
describing it as an "[u]nderenforced [n]orm"); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
158.
Bradley & Kelley, supra note 141, at 10.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
159.
Bradley & Kelley, supra note 141, at 14.
160.
161.
Cf. id. ("Regulatory delegations also may raise questions for legal scholars
about the extent to which domestic administrative-law concepts should be applied to
the international arena."). Bradley and Kelley point out that "[a]s can be the case in
domestic law, there may be uncertainties associated with the distinction between
legislative and regulatory delegations." Id. However, as noted below, see infra text
accompanying note 171, a delegation of accounting authority, such as Congress'
delegation to the SEC in the '33 Act, seems on its face to be a delegation of "authority
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The dearth of explicit constitutional guidance on the subject of
international delegations means that any constitutional limitations
on such delegations must be inferred from the governmental
structure established by the Constitution and from a critical analysis
of the effects of international delegations on that structure. Because
the Constitution was written at least in part to establish a sovereign
nation with the capability to act independently in the international
sphere, 16 2 this Note takes the position that any constitutional bar to
international delegations must be derived from such delegations'
effects on the kind of independent national sovereignty the U.S.
Constitution, or, for that matter, any constitution, establishes or
reaffirms. 163 Thoroughly defining national sovereignty is neither
possible nor necessary within the framework of this Note; for the
purposes of this Note, it is enough to say that the United States, by
virtue of its Constitution, possesses the kind of sovereignty,
particularly in relation to international bodies, possessed by other
164
independent nations.
While some scholars argue that an international delegation is
equivalent to a derogation of national sovereignty, 165 others assert
that such a delegation is actually an exercise of that sovereignty. 166
Hathaway argues that "[i]f international delegations exist only when
domestic lawmaking authorities say they do, then international

to create administrative rules to implement, fill gaps in, or interpret" laws passed
through normal legislative channels. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 141, at 14.
162.
Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
("As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in [the
field of foreign affairs] are equal to the right and power of the other members of the
international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign.");
Osborn v. President of Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 808 (1824) ("Those who
framed the constitution, intended to establish a government complete for its own
purposes, supreme within its sphere, and capable of acting by its own proper powers.");
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 358 (1819) ("[T]he United States are
sovereign, as to all the powers specifically given to their government, and as to all
others necessary and proper to carry into effect those specified.").
163.
Cf. Nathan J. Brown, Constitutionalism, Authoritarianism, and
Imperialism in Iraq, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 924 (2005) (noting that one purpose of
constitution drafting is to affirm and support national sovereignty).
164.
See Curtiss-WrightExp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 318.
165.
See, e.g.,
JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS 34 (1998).
[T]he threat . . . that international commitments will distort or derange the
normal workings of our own system, leaving it less able to resolve policy
disputes in ways acceptable to the American people. Global governance, then,
does not threaten to replace the American government, but it does threaten to
distract and confuse and, ultimately, to weaken it.
Id.
166.
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box:
Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1994 (2004)
(viewing various international conventions as "the results of an exercise of sovereignty,
not as evidence of a lapse of sovereignty").
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delegations are not best understood as contrary to legitimate
domestic authority; they are instead better understood as another site
through which that authority is expressed."' 167 Likewise, Gelber
argues that "[s]overeignty and state power have never in practice
been absolute, even in the domestic realm" because "in the case of
major powers many, and certainly most, of the important limitations
168
upon sovereignty have been by choice."'
In this sense, an international delegation of authority by
Congress is no different from a delegation of authority to a federal
administrative agency, in that Congress chooses to exercise its own
power by giving away a portion of it. The comparison is particularly
apt where Congress chooses to make a delegation of authority, either
to an international body or to a federal administrative agency, in
order to take advantage of that particular body's expertise in a
specialized or highly technical field. 169 In the context of taking
advantage of an organization's expertise, a delegation by Congress to
an accounting standard-setting body makes perfect sense.
Furthermore, because Congress' original delegation of accounting
rulemaking authority to the SEC merely allows the SEC to fill gaps
in the original statutes, as opposed to making new law, 170 it seems
that the delegation of such authority would not violate the
nondelegation doctrine as a delegation of pure legislative authority.
Hence, analyzing an international delegation of accounting
rulemaking authority under the same framework as a domestic
delegation of that same authority would at least lead to the
conclusion that such a delegation would not be presumptively invalid
under current constitutional limitations on Congress' ability to
delegate. It is important to note, though, that to the extent such a
delegation is both an exercise and a ceding of some portion of national
sovereignty, it is necessary that a representative lawmaking body
takes responsibility for and actually makes the delegation in
171
question.

167.
Oona A. Hathaway, InternationalDelegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 122 (2008).
168.

HARRY G. GELBER, SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INTERDEPENDENCE 75 (1997).

169.
Cf. Susannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative
Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL L. REV. 929, 930 (1993) ("[A]dministrative agencies
are presumed to have special knowledge in the fields that they regulate. Thus,
Congress generally has given agencies significant authority and discretion to use their
expertise to serve the broader public good.").
170.
See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ('The power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily
requires . . . the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.").
171.
See supra text accompanying note 167 (asserting that a delegation of
sovereignty as an exercise of sovereignty when performed by "domestic lawmaking
authorities"). A delegation of authority to an international body would, of course, likely
also involve some interaction between Congress and the Executive branch; the main
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A similar assertion is that international delegations should be
judged through a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the costs incurred
when a nation elects to transfer some of its own authority to an
international organization versus the benefits that accrue to that
nation. 172 For example, Gelber asserts that, given the "progressive
internationalisation and globalisation of economic and technical
forces," such international arrangements are critical because
questions had arisen as to whether "the nation-state [was] any longer
adequate for the management of its citizens' interests. 1 7 3 Judging
international delegations from a cost-benefit perspective will
necessarily entail case-by-case consideration, but such consideration
is precisely the kind of task a deliberative body such as Congress is
designed to undertake.
The sum total of all that has thus far been said on the
constitutionality of international delegations leads to but one clear
conclusion: if there exists any constitutional limitation or bar on such
delegations, it is implied and not express. This Note does not seek to
answer the question of the constitutionality of any and all
international delegations (particularly as it is likely that no concrete
answer to the question will be had until the issue is brought before
the Supreme Court, and possibly not even then), but merely to
address the question as it specifically relates to the recognition of
IFRS, as promulgated by IASB, in the U.S. Because the debate
concerning the constitutionality of international delegations is
currently unsettled, and because there is at least no express, textual
constitutional bar to such delegations, this Note takes the position
that a recognition of IASB as an authoritative accounting standardsetter is constitutionally permissible, but only if Congress, and not
the SEC, makes such an international delegation of authority. In
addition to the arguments made above related to international
delegations as an exercise of sovereignty and to the validity of
international delegations as a function of specific costs and benefits,
there are at least two reasons, taken together, that recognition of
IASB by Congress would not be constitutionally offensive. First, any
such recognition would presumably be revocable at the will of
Congress because no treaty or other binding agreement would be
required for such recognition. 174 Second, given the ability of Congress

thrust of Hathaway's statement cited in supra note 167 seems to be that an
international delegation of sovereignty must be performed by some elected, politically
accountable body.
172.
See Hathaway, supra note 167, at 116 ("[R]ecent scholarship portrays the
costs of delegation as larger than they in fact are. Moreover, recent work has lost sight
of some of the substantial benefits of cooperation.").
173.
GELBER, supra note 168, at 33.
174.
Cf. Cunningham, SECs Global Accounting Vision, supra note 129, at 41
C'Indeed, the SEC has plenary power over establishing accounting standards in the US.
Its delegation to FASB, or to any other body, is revocable at will."). This assumes that
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to revoke IASB's authoritative status, Congress would still be
politically accountable should IASB fail to prove "capable of
improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial reporting and
the protection of investors under176 the securities laws,"'175 thus
negating one of Ku's main concerns.
At this stage, it is important to note that though there may not
be a constitutional bar on Congress's ability to make such a
delegation, this does not necessarily mean that Congress should take
such action-or, in other words, that such action would constitute
good policy.
B. Policy ConsiderationsRegardingInternationalDelegations
Although some policy considerations may be universal to all
different types of international delegations, this section will focus on
those considerations specifically related to the U.S. recognition of
IASB, centering on one overarching question: Would the U.S. use of
international accounting standards work to further the SEC's
mission? Perhaps the most perplexing difficulty in answering this
177
question is that the SEC's mission is not only to protect investors.
In its rulemaking activities, the SEC is also statutorily commanded to
consider "whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.' 78 The IASB's potential for furthering both of
these two potentially competing priorities 179 must be analyzed in
order to judge the wisdom of the recognition of IASB and IFRS in the
U.S.
1.

Accounting as an Expression of National and Financial Forces

One of the primary difficulties involved in assessing the potential
efficacy of U.S. use of IFRS is that U.S. investors have long been

such a recognition of IASB would carry the same degree of formality and revocability as
the SEC's current recognition of FASB.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
175.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
176.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
177.
178.
Securities Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2008).
The argument that these two priorities are in some sense competitive is as
179.
follows: A financial disclosure scheme which requires essentially no detailed financial
information from a company seeking to access public capital would allow essentially
any company to procure funds from investors, but would expose such investors to a
high risk that the companies in which they invest are not financially viable, if not in
some cases an outright sham. On the other hand, an incredibly restrictive financial
disclosure scheme which requires companies to produce a high volume of financial
data, potentially at a prohibitive cost, gives investors greater assurance that any
company in which they choose to invest has a high likelihood of financial viability, but
limits the number of companies which will be able to access public capital given such
limitations.
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accustomed to accounting standards issued by an organization,
FASB, which specifically addresses U.S. accounting issues.1 80 "[A]s
an international organization with international members and
constituencies, it could be difficult for IASB to commit to protecting
investors under US law. Certainly it is harder for IASB to look out
for US investors than it is for FASB to do so. '1 s8 This conclusion
naturally flows from the fact that accounting systems developed in
individual countries (before the proliferation of international
accounting standards) reflect two major driving forces, or two major
categories of driving forces-this Note refers to them as 1"national"
82
and "financial"-that are not identical in any two countries.
a.

National Forces

The "national" forces which shape the development of accounting
regimes in individual countries are those forces related to and derived
18 3
from the country's unique governmental and cultural identity.
These forces can be grouped into at least five categories: "cultural,"
"linguistic," "political and civil," "economic and demographic," and
"legal and tax." 18 4 The principle is simple: "accounting objectives,
standards, policies, and techniques result from environmental factors
in each country; if these environmental factors differ significantly
between countries, it would be expected that the major accounting
concepts and practices in use . . . would also differ." 18 5 National
factors run the gamut from the concrete (i.e., a country's statutory
method of tax collection)1 8 6 to the abstract (i.e., "attitudes, norms,
[and] values"). 18 7 An accounting system which attempts either to
ignore or transcend the fundamental differences between nations in
these fields might well prove confusing to businesses, investors, and
accounting practitioners, all of whom are accustomed to dealing with
accounting principles which more closely align with the nationalistic
factors with which they are personally and institutionally familiar.
And while it is possible to draw similarities between various nations'

180.

See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.

181.
Cunningham Letter, supranote 128, at 4.
182.
These two broad categories necessarily overlap. For example, the extent to
which a nation's economy is considered a capitalist economy would alter both the
national and the financial dynamic. Nevertheless, there are enough unique components
to each category that it is useful to view the two separately.
183.

(1985).
184.
185.
186.
187.
(1972)).

AHMED BELKAOUI, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 28

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 29.
at 28.
at 49.
at 29 (quoting H. TRIANDIS, THE ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE CULTURE 3
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accounting systems based on their national similarities,18 8 it is
equally impossible to craft one set of accounting principals which
could apply with equal force and accuracy to all nations regardless of
89
their national differences.'
b.

Financial Forces

The "financial" forces which shape the development of various
accounting systems deal with the structure of the particular nation's
capital markets and monetary and investment frameworks. 9 0 These
forces include the sources of capital and their relationships to
business enterprises, 191 the nation's level of inflation,19 2 the relative
"[s]ize and [c]omplexity" of the nation's business entities, 19 3 and the
"[s]ophistication" of the nation's "[flinancial [c]ommunity."'1 94 So, for
example, a country whose businesses primarily derive their capital
from public securities markets (such as the U.S. or UK) would
necessarily differ in its accounting principles from a country whose
businesses primarily derive capital from large, private banks (such as
Japan or Germany). 195 Just as no two countries' nationalistic factors
are identical, as noted above, neither are any two countries' financial
forces identical.
With regard to investors in a securities market, these financially
driven differences in accounting systems across countries are

188.
One accounting' text defines "four major accounting models" into which
most nations can be grouped: "British-American," "Continental," "South American,"
and "Mixed Economy." GERHARD G. MUELLER ET AL., ACCOUNTING: AN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 8-12 (1994). An even broader classification places accounting systems
into one of two groups-"rules-based" and "principles-based"-with U.S GAAP being
considered a "rules-based" system and IFRS a "principles-based" system. Cunningham,
SEC's Global Accounting Vision, supra note 129, at 13. The line dividing the two
systems was considered clear enough that as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress
directed the SEC to "conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial
reporting system of a principles-based accounting system." Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 108(d)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7218(d)(1)(A) (2008). However, some commentators argue
that a rules-based vs. principles-based distinction is overbroad and inaccurate. See,
e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of "PrinciplesBased Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1411, 1413 (2007) ("These classifications are too crude to describe or guide the
design of ... accounting systems.").

189.
See MUELLER ET AL., supra note 188, at 8 ("No two countries have identical
financial accounting practices. Each country is a unique mixture of environmental
variables that together have influenced the pattern of accounting development in that
country.").
190.
See id. at 3-8 (outlining variables that shape accounting development).
191.
Id. at 3.
192.
Id. at 6.
193.
Id. at 7.
194.
Id.
195.
See id. at 3-4 (contrasting the securities-based and banking-based
systems).
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significant because, in some respect, accounting data can serve as an
indicator of a company's risk (and, therefore, the risk passed on to
any investor who might consider purchasing the company's
securities). 196 To the extent that two different accounting systems
would produce two different sets of data regarding a company's
current financial status, these two data sets would provide different
assessments of the risk inherent in investing in the company.
An illustration of this phenomenon proves helpful. "It is widely
believed that larger firms are less risky than smaller firms" when the
firm's size is defined as the sum total of its assets. 19 7 Assume, then,
that a fictional company, XYZ Co., owns a certain mix of assets at
some given point in time. Assume also that at least some of these
assets do not have a concrete and definite value at any given point in
time. 198 To the extent that two different accounting systems would
dictate that these assets be assigned a different value at any given
point in time, the two accounting systems would produce a different
financial "snapshot" of XYZ Co. The use of one asset valuation
scheme-a system which assigned the assets the lower aggregate
value-might dissuade some potential investors from purchasing XYZ
stock, while the use of the system assigning the assets the higher
aggregate value might encourage some investors to purchase XYZ
stock. This occurs even though the objective quality, nature, and
character of XYZ's assets are exactly the same no matter which
accounting regime is utilized. In short, because investors (at least
many of them) base their investment decisions on financial
accounting data, changing the accounting system which produces the
data will in many cases change the behavior of investors.

196.
See William Beaver et al., The Association Between Market Determinedand
Accounting DeterminedRisk Measures, 45 ACCT. REV. 654, 654 (1970) ("The accounting
system generates information on several relationships that are considered by many to
be measures of risk.") As an interesting side note, one of this article's co-authors,
Myron Scholes, shared the 1997 Nobel Prize in economics. All Laureates in Economics,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
197.
Beaver et al.,
supra note 196, at 662.
198.
The most obvious example of an asset with a concrete and definite value is
cash. An example of an asset without such a concrete value, thereby necessitating the
use of one particular valuation method as opposed to another, would be a machine used
in a manufacturing business. Perhaps the two most sensible and common methods of
valuation for such an asset are (1) to determine the fair market value of the machine at
a given point in time (assuming that such a value could be reasonably ascertained), or
(2) to determine the value as a function of the original purchase price of the machine
less the value of the "wear and tear" incurred in the machine's use to date. Although
these two valuation methods should generally approximate one another, they are by no
means identical. For illustrations of the use of these two methods of asset valuation,
known respectively as "[niet realizable value accounting" and "[h]istorical cost
accounting," see BELKAOUI, supranote 183, at 133, 130.
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Currently, U.S. GAAP and the IFRS system promulgated by
IASB differ in many ways in how they value particular assets. 199
Therefore, viewing a certain company through the lens of IFRS as
opposed to GAAP (or vice versa) might well give investors the
impression that the company is either a more or a less risky
investment than would viewing the company through the lens of the
other accounting system, potentially leading investors to change their
investment decision, which could, quite possibly, change the
company's ability to raise capital. Overall, the current differences in
GAAP-based and IFRS-based accounting methodologies are
significant enough to affect how investors would view a company that
200
produced financial statements under both accounting systems.
Because a country's accounting system is so fundamentally grounded
in that particular country's unique nationalistic and financial
characteristics, a switch to an alternate accounting system-one
based on different nationalistic and financial characteristics, and
possibly on the conglomerate of many countries' nationalistic and
financial characteristics-might well result in that country's
investors being confused by the new system and thereafter making
less efficient investment decisions.
2.

The Effect of Accounting System Choice on Capital Formation

If a switch from GAAP to IFRS in the U.S. capital markets would
result in confusion and potentially inefficient investment decisions by
U.S. investors, thereby seemingly undermining the SEC's
performance of its mission to protect investors, the adoption of an
IFRS-based accounting system would undoubtedly assist the SEC in
performing the other part of its mission: fostering competition and

199.

See

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,

SIMILARITIES

AND

DIFFERENCES:

A

OF IFRS AND U.S. GAAP 39-49 (2007), available at http://www.pwc.coml
gxleng/about/svcs/corporatereporting/SandDO7.pdf
(outlining differences between
IFRS-based and GAAP-based asset valuation schemes).
200.
A recent study found that out of 130 companies that produced IFRS-based
financial statements containing a reconciliation to GAAP, only two companies reported
the same earnings under both regimes. Of the eighty-four companies which reported
higher earnings under IFRS, "the median earnings increase was 12.9%" over GAAP; of
the forty-four companies which reported higher earnings under GAAP, "the difference
was 9.1%." InternationalAccounting Standards:Opportunities, Challenges, and Global
Convergence Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and UrbanAffairs, 110th Cong. 5-6
(2007) (statement of Jack T. Ciesielski, President, R.G. Associates, Inc.), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/ files/ciesielski.pdf. The study noted that differences of these
magnitudes were large enough that the SEC would consider them "material," meaning
that "it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report
would have been changed or influenced." Id. at 6 (quoting SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45, 150 (1999)).
COMPARISON
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capital formation. 20 1 In recent years, the U.S. has begun to lose its
grip on its status as the world leader in raising capital through public
securities markets. 20 2 Indeed, the percentage of worldwide initial
public offerings occurring in the U.S. dropped from 50% in 2000 to a
mere 5% in 2006.203 While some of that decrease can undoubtedly be
blamed on the more stringent internal control requirements dictated
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 20 4 (for better or for worse), a switch to an
IFRS-based financial disclosure system in the U.S. would certainly
encourage some foreign companies, for whom preparing financial
statements according to U.S. GAAP (or even providing a
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP) would prove prohibitively costly or
inefficient, to list their securities on a U.S.-based exchange and gain
access to U.S. public capital markets.2 0 5 The SEC has even publicly
acknowledged that recognition of IFRS in the U.S. would promote
20 6
capital formation in the U.S. by foreign securities issuers.

201.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Professor Lawrence
Cunningham notes that it is overly simplistic to conclude that a U.S. switch to IFRS
would facilitate capital formation, because "[i]f investors are confused, capital
formation likely will be impaired." E-mail from Lawrence A. Cunningham, Professor of
Law, George Washington University Law School, to Jacob L. Barney (Feb. 26, 2008) (on
file with author). However, given the statistics found in note 202 and the text
accompanying note 203, infra, it seems that the use of IFRS might well provide a shot
in the arm to a U.S. IPO market that has seemingly floundered over the past several
years.
202.
See Jenny Anderson, About Those Fears of Wall Street's Decline, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at C6 (explaining that"[i]n 2006, the New York exchanges raised
$46.6 billion; Hong Kong raised $47.1 billion; and London, $55.2 billion" and that while
"New York raised 54 percent less than it did in 2000," "London raised 303 percent more
and Hong Kong, 225 percent more").
203.
William A. Niskanen, Op-Ed., Enron's Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A21.
204.
See Anderson, supra note 202 ("[W]hen the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China went public in 2006, raising $22 billion, it opted against a United States
listing because of Sarbanes-Oxley, according to people involved in the I.P.O.
discussions.").
205.
See Jeremy Grant & Jennifer Hughes, SEC Launches Effort to Streamline
Reporting for Non-US Companies, FIN. TIMES (London), June 20, 2007, at 27 (quoting
an accounting firm partner as stating that "[flor those who aren't yet listed in the US
and have been concerned about the costs of obtaining a listing," the ability to file IFRSbased financial statements "no doubt ... removes one of the obstacles").
206.
See Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements
Prepared in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,962, 37,966-67 (proposed July 11, 2007)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239 & 249) (acknowledging that when the
SEC first "sought to facilitate the transition to IFRS," it "recognized that this
accommodation would reduce costs to foreign issuers and encourage their continued
participation in the U.S. public capital market, which would benefit investors by
increasing investment possibilities and furthering the efficient allocation of capital"). It
is important to note here that, as the SEC recognized in the quote above, there is value
given to investors by allowing them a broader range of investment choices in U.S.
capital markets. Although giving securities issuers a choice as to which accounting
system (IFRS or U.S. GAAP) controls the creation of their financial statements and
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In the end, the question of whether a U.S. adoption of
international financial reporting standards would constitute sound
policy must be answered by balancing the need to protect investors
with the need to promote healthy, vibrant, and robust capital
markets in the U.S. The answer to this question is primarily a policy
judgment, and attempting to determine the correct answer is beyond
the scope of this Note. Given the actions that the SEC has already
taken, 20 7 it seems impossible to doubt that the current trajectory
makes universal acceptance of IFRS in the U.S.-for both foreign and
domestic securities issuers-almost certain. It is certainly reasonable
to conclude that such a course is the right one for the U.S. and its
capital markets. However, it is also reasonable to expect that such a
dramatic shift in U.S. financial policy should come as a result of
careful consideration and extensive deliberation by a representative
body-Congress.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE ACTION

This Note concludes that, at this time, the SEC has no statutory
authority to subdelegate its accounting rulemaking authority to the
IASB, given the limitations set out in U.S. Telecom. Under U.S.
Telecom, express congressional authorization is required before such
a delegation can be made. 208 Likewise, this Note concludes that it is
essential that any delegation of federal power to an international
organization be made by a representative and politically accountable
body-in this case, Congress. Therefore, Congress must step in and
take a more active role in the discussion of whether a U.S. recognition
of IFRS would promote both the SEC's obligation to protect investors
and its obligation to promote market efficiency and the free flow of
capital.
A. A Path Forwardfor Congress
Congress has already held one set of hearings on the issues
posed by the adoption of international accounting standards in the
United States. 20 9 However, given that four of the eight panel
members at the hearing represented either the SEC, FASB, or

other disclosures might not truly be an activity meant to "protect" investors, this is not
to say that investors do not in the end reap some benefit from the representation of a
wider variety of securities issuers, and thereby a wider variety of investment
opportunities, in U.S. markets.
207.
See supra note 7-10 and accompanying text.
208.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
209.
110 CONG. REC. S13, 273-390 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2007).
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IASB,2 10 more independent dialogue is needed to establish the full
ramifications of a recognition of international accounting standardsboth for investors and for public companies. Further hearings should
devote adequate time and attention to issues of investor protection,
capital formation, and legal and oversight-related issues inherent in
an SEC subdelegation to and relationship with a foreign-based
A study of the effects, both as to the
standard-setting body.
protection of investors and as to capital formation and market
efficiency, that the adoption of IFRS has had on another country-for
example, the UK, whose national accounting system is in many ways
similar to U.S. GAAp 2 11-would also be illustrative of the potential
costs and benefits of IFRS adoption in the U.S., and Congress would
serve the public interest well by conducting such a study.
Ultimately, given the SEC's lack of authority to delegate
accounting rulemaking authority to a private organization without
express congressional authorization under U.S. Telecom, Congress
must provide the SEC with explicit statutory authorization to
recognize JASB as an organization with the power to create
accounting standards which are controlling under U.S. securities
laws. This is especially true if Congress finds that an adoption of
international accounting standards would help the SEC to fulfill its
twofold mission of protecting investors and promoting capital
Given that such accounting
formation and market efficiency.
standards constitute "rules" under the APA,212 the SEC would be
required to follow APA-prescribed rulemaking procedures 213 in
approving new accounting standards. As an alternative to this
process, and to allow new accounting standards to be introduced
efficiently and expeditiously, Congress could give the SEC statutory

Id.
210.
211.
See supra note 188.
212.
See supra note 96.
213.
See supra note 119 for discussion of "notice-and-comment rulemaking." It is
important to note that the SEC did engage in typical notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures when it recently promulgated a final rule allowing foreign private issuers to
file with the SEC financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS and without
a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. However,
given that such a rule incorporates dozens of preexisting accounting standards which
themselves seem to meet the definition of a "rule," as well as giving IASB the authority
to promulgate binding accounting standards in the future without utilizing further
notice-and-comment procedures to ratify those future standards for official use, the
author is of the opinion that passing one rule to encompass and grant official
recognition to all past and future IFRS is simply insufficient. Cf. IFRS and IAS
Summaries: English, http://www.iasb.org/IFRS+Summaries/IFRS+and+IAS+
Summaries+English+2008/IFRS+and+IAS+Summaries+English.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2009) (noting the existence of eight International Financial Reporting Standards
and forty-one International Accounting Standards as of January 1, 2008).

618

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42.379

authorization to bypass normal notice- and-comment rulemaking
214
requirements, as it did for OSHA in Noblecraft.
B. JudicialReview of the SEC's Recognition of IFRS
If Congress does not give the SEC explicit statutory
authorization to subdelegate rulemaking authority to IASB, as
required under U.S. Telecom, the SEC's recognition of IFRS as
controlling under the federal securities laws is likely reviewable in
federal court.2 15 The APA gives "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action" the right to judicial review of such action. 216 The APA
precludes access to judicial review when the underlying agency
statute "preclude[s] judicial review" or when "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law," 217 but it appears that nothing
in either the '33 Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which grant the SEC
authority to promulgate substantive accounting rules, precludes
judicial review of actions taken thereunder, and the presence of
specific requirements which an accounting "standard setting body"
must meet in order to gain official recognition from the SEC under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2 18 make it clear that granting such
recognition is not "committed to [the SEC's] discretion by law."
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the APA
provision for judicial review should be interpreted liberally:
manifests a
The legislative material elucidating [the APA]
congressional intention that it cover a broad spectrum of administrative
actions, and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the
Administrative Procedure Act's "generous review provisions" must be
given a "hospitable" interpretation.... [0]nly upon a showing of "clear
and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the
2 19
courts restrict access to judicial review.

Of course, a judicial challenge to the SEC's subdelegation must
come from a party actually "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the
recognition of IFRS. 220 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
standing to challenge an administrative agency's action requires that
"the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."221 Such a
complainant might be a U.S. investor who owns shares in a foreign

See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
214.
215.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2008).
216.
Id.
Id. § 701(a)(1)-(2).
217.
218.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
219.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 843 (1985) (alterations in original)
(quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
220.
5 U.S.C. § 702.
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
221.
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securities issuer that is no longer required to file financial statements
prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP (either directly or via
reconciliation from IFRS). This would particularly be the case where
the company's previous filings showed a wide discrepancy between,
for example, IFRS-based and GAAP-based earnings, 222 thus raising
in the mind of such an investor questions as to the reliability of such
financial statements, 223 at least with respect to the comparability of
current financial statements with previous financial statements
issued by the company. Such an investor would definitely fall within
the "zone of interest" of the '33 Act, which gave the SEC authority to
promulgate substantive accounting rules, 224 as the Act was.passed
largely to protect investors by providing them with the information
necessary to make sound investment de6isions. 225 The investor would
be "adversely affected or aggrieved" because the SEC's allowance of
foreign issuers to file financial statements prepared under IFRS (the
"agency action" required by the APA) would result in the investor
receiving a financial data set that is either incomplete or misleading,
at least when compared to the company's previous GAAP-based
financial statements (meeting the "adversely affected or aggrieved"
requirement). An investor's challenge in court of the SEC's actions
would not, however, be based on substantive differences in the
financial statements of a company in which he owns stock; it would be
based on the SEC's lack of legal authority to grant recognition to
IFRS, recognition that would lead directly to the substantive
differences in the financial statements. The APA provides multiple
grounds for a judicial remedy to an agency action not supported by
sufficient legal authority. 226 In such a case, a reviewing court should

222.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
223.
See Yohn Statement, supra note 11 (arguing that IFRS-based financial
statements do not currently provide U.S. investors with sufficient information on which
to base their investment decisions).
224.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2008).
225.
See SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that the court "construe[s] the Securities Acts broadly to effectuate Congress'
purpose to protect investors"); SEC v. Gorsek, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (C.D. Ill.
2001) ('The Securities Act of 1933 was intended to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce .....

').

In addition, such an investor would fall within the "zone of interest"

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which allows the SEC to recognize as authoritative
accounting standards promulgated by a body which meets certain standards. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2008); S.REP. No. 107-205, at
2 (2002) (noting that consideration of the bill came largely as a result of the "investor
protection issues raised by the financial revelations involving Enron and other public
companies").
226.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2008) (directing a "reviewing court" to "hold unlawful
and set aside any agency action ... found to be" either "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"; "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right"; or "without
observance of procedure required by law").
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conclude that the SEC did not have the required statutory authority
under U.S. Telecom to recognize IASB as an authorized standardsetter.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although delegations of the federal government's authority to
international organizations involve many complex legal and policyrelated issues, international subdelegations by administrative
agencies involve a unique intersection of international and
administrative law which does not lend itself to easy or even
universally applicable solutions. And though such subdelegations are
bound to become more and more commonplace given the proliferation
of substantive international law in recent years, it does not
necessarily follow that they will become any less controversial or
easier to analyze. The U.S. recognition of IFRS and its inherent
difficulties serve to underscore this point.
Considering the near-seismic shift in U.S. securities law and
financial reporting that will likely result from a recognition of
international accounting standards in the U.S., it seems only
reasonable to expect that Congress, the most representative and most
politically accountable of all branches of the federal government,
would take the lead in deliberating and coming to a conclusion as to
whether such recognition should be extended. While the SEC's
expertise in administering the nation's securities laws should go a
long way in informing the congressional dialogue, ultimate approval
of the transition to IFRS must come from Congress.
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